European security: a common concept of the 27 WEU Countries

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INTRODUCTION

1. Over the last decade, many changes have taken place in Europe. A new security architecture is under construction, made possible by the end of the Cold War. In developing the architecture, European States have acknowledged that their security is indivisible, that a comprehensive approach should underlie the concept of security and that cooperative mechanisms should be applied in order to promote security and stability in the whole of the continent. These are being strengthened through international agreements, through declarations aimed at the implementation of the principles, enshrined in the UN Charter, of the sovereign equality and inviolability of internationally recognized borders and through the establishment of international organizations based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. WEU, EU, NATO, and the OSCE each take these general principles into account when playing their respective roles in the newly emerging security architecture.

2. All European States are committed to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, the OSCE documents and the Stability Pact, and all the States taking part in this common reflection are members of the Council of Europe. No other region of the world has gone so far towards building an international order based on legal instruments.

3. However, with the end of the period of global confrontation embodied in the Cold War, new kinds of security concerns, tension and conflict have emerged, to which Europe and its North American partners must find new answers.

4. WEU countries have decided to examine together the new conditions of their security. The aim of this collective endeavour, itself a contribution to the process of integration - one of the cornerstones of peace in Europe - is to identify the common interests of Europeans, the risks and potential threats, but also Europe’s new responsibilities in a strategic environment in which Europe’s security is not confined to security in Europe, and in which Europe has acquired the capability to make its own contribution to the building of a just and peaceful world order.

5. To fulfil that aim, Chapter I analyses the wide range of security challenges that confront Europe. Many of these challenges will be addressed collectively through international cooperation and the process of European integration as the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, WEU is in a position to respond to many of the challenges identified in the politico-military field.
6. Chapter II identifies some of the ways in which WEU countries, in the framework of the emerging European security architecture, can contribute to security and stability in Europe, in neighbouring areas and in the wider world. Special emphasis has been given to the responses WEU can bring to enhancing European capabilities in the field of crisis-prevention and management.

7. Finally, in this exercise for the first time all WEU countries have worked together in such an important matter as their common security. It has proved to be a singular opportunity for a better mutual understanding and provided all participants with the possibility of harmonizing their views on WEU's contribution to the emerging security architecture for Europe.
Chapter I

The new European security conditions: challenges and risks

I. THE COMMON SECURITY INTERESTS OF EUROPE

A. The Foundations of European security

8. Europe is witnessing the emergence of a new framework of global security to promote greater stability throughout the continent. Europe and its neighbouring regions have a shared interest in this respect.

9. This new security framework is based on a broad concept of security. The process of European integration has made a major contribution to the security of Europe. This process has created the basis for the development of peaceful relations between European states. A landmark of major importance is the Treaty on European Union. The European Union has become a model of prosperity, stability and peace. It is striving for the economic development and stability of its members and its partners. As a complement to its economic and commercial weight and commensurate with its wider responsibilities, it is establishing a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might, in time, lead to a common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance. In this, it will rely in particular on WEU, an integral part of the development of the European Union.

10. The development of an EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, as well as all the earlier, recent and future enlargements of the EU, enhance stability and security on the Continent. The Europe Agreements, with their clear perspective of membership, mark the need that is felt for developing the involvement of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the EU’s foreign and security policy. Reinforced political dialogue has been established covering in particular meetings with CFSP bodies from expert to Ministerial level and association with EU joint actions, declarations or démarches.

As called for in WEU’s Maastricht Declaration
11. In the Treaty on European Union, WEU, which is an integral part of the development of the European Union, was requested to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the EU which have defence implications. In June 1992 WEU Ministers agreed that, apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units made available to WEU could be employed for humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and other tasks of combat forces in crisis management. In May 1994 WEU Ministers agreed the arrangements for Associate Partnership, thus involving the countries of Central Europe in WEU’s activities. In November that year the Noordwijk Ministerial meeting endorsed preliminary conclusions on the formulation of a Common European Defence Policy.

12. Under their status of association, WEU’s Associate Partners can participate in sessions of the WEU Council and working groups and may take part in WEU operations in the framework of the Petersberg Declaration. WEU, as the defence component of the EU and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance, is being further developed in full complementarity with the transatlantic nature of the Alliance, and should not duplicate existing structures.

13. NATO continues to play an essential role in reinforcing stability and security in Europe. It has always been a political community of nations committed to promoting shared values and defending common interests. The transatlantic link, embodied by NATO and the substantial North American military presence in Europe, continues to make a crucial contribution to the security of Europe. In November 1991, NATO approved a new strategic concept. This reaffirmed the Alliance’s core functions and the importance of the transatlantic link and decided that the creation of a European identity in defence and security issues would underline the preparedness of European nations to take a greater share of responsibility and help to reinforce transatlantic solidarity. At the Brussels summit in January 1994, NATO leaders agreed that the emergence of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) would strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance while reinforcing the transatlantic link. They authorised the further adaptation of the Alliance’s political and military structures to reflect its new roles and missions and the development of the emerging ESDI, including the development of separable but not separate capabilities that could be used by NATO or WEU.

14. The democratic revolutions and other historic transformations towards democracy at the end of the 1980’s and the early 1990’s and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact brought the Cold War to an end. These developments greatly reduced the risk of massive confrontation and gave a new impetus to the process of European integration. The common historical and cultural heritage of Europe and the new political situation on the continent should be reflected in the new European security framework.
15. The successful transformation of the political, legal and economic systems of the Central and Eastern European countries and the process of their integration into European and transatlantic institutions are of fundamental importance for the security and stability of Europe. The enlargement of these institutions should go hand in hand with the strengthening of cooperation with all those European countries that wish it, including Russia and Ukraine.

16. Without prejudice to the efforts and responsibilities of the European Union, WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, the OSCE is performing an important role in promoting stability and cooperation throughout Europe, and with its North American partners, in particular in the field of conflict prevention. The OSCE is currently undertaking a discussion for a common and comprehensive security model for Europe in the 21st century. Bearing in mind the vast array of OSCE activities, the discussion on a Security Model can be expected to reaffirm OSCE's central position in the European security architecture, but without any mandate to control other institutions. The OSCE is, inter alia, an important venue for dialogue with those countries that do not wish or are not likely to become full members of the Western security organizations. The OSCE, as a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, should be further developed into a primary instrument of early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management.

17. The CFE Treaty to which most WEU nations are parties marked a turning point in the arms control and disarmament process in Europe. It remains a cornerstone for European security and stability. The Treaty's full and timely implementation and the preservation of its integrity is of crucial importance.

18. In addition, the agreed confidence and security-building measures enhancing transparency and predictability need to be applied faithfully and, where appropriate, to be developed further.

B. Common values and interests

1. Democratic values and human rights, the defence of peace, international order and the rule of law

19. All European states have an interest in the maintenance of international peace and order and the widest possible observance of generally recognised norms of conduct between states. This is not just because of the need to minimize the risk of conflicts and instability affecting Europe itself, but also because Europe's prosperity and its position in world affairs depend on free and orderly conditions for international economic intercourse and on the widest possible international cooperation in tasks such as arms control and disarmament, non-proliferation, combating terrorism, crime and the protection of the environment.
Experience both within and outside Europe shows that democratic institutions, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law are among the best guarantees of peaceful, predictable and cooperative behaviour between states as well. They ensure that national armed forces, and the machinery of government as a whole, are properly answerable to public opinion and democratic institutions and cannot be used as an instrument of oppression either inside or beyond the state. These principles are enshrined in the documents of the UN, OSCE and Council of Europe and hold the key to the successful handling of problems involving national ethnic as well as religious minorities, and the prevention and the peaceful and enduring settlement of conflicts. However, neither the UN nor other multilateral institutions are yet in a position to meet all the new challenges they face. There is a greater need than ever for international regulating instruments. Further efforts must be based on the effective implementation of the existing principles and commitments established within the framework of the UN, OSCE and the Council of Europe. The UN faces constant demands but still lacks the means to meet all its responsibilities.

European states have committed themselves both to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and - on the basis of shared values - support efforts to pre-empt and correct breaches of those principles by others. All WEU nations belong to the Council of Europe which has legally binding obligations and acts as a monitor and supporter of democratic practices, rule of law and human rights throughout its membership¹. They also belong to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which enshrines detailed norms of democratic behaviour and human rights among its political commitments and possesses a range of instruments for preventing and correcting shortcomings in these areas (vide especially the Paris Charter and the Copenhagen Document of 1990).

Europe’s worldwide economic interests

Growing European economic integration, for which the European Union is the driving force, has created and reinforced interdependence and solidarity among Europeans. The political initiatives taken by the European Union towards its Central and Eastern European partners are a logical extension of the same process. European association agreements are designed to reinforce economic and political stability and to increase the interdependence and solidarity of European countries. For its part, the Pact on Stability also has an economic dimension.

The European Union has reached economic agreements with a number of European countries. Partnership agreements with Russia and Ukraine, for example, and those concluded under the forms of cooperation now being set up with countries south of the Mediterranean, will help prevent economic imbalances from becoming threats to the security of our continent.

24. The maintenance of communications links within its territory is a prerequisite for the efficient functioning of the modern state. Threats to communications systems could turn out, depending on their scope, to be threats to the economy and security of the state. The improvement of cross-border communications is an important factor in promoting trade and the free exchange of ideas, thus enhancing interdependence between states and increasing the stake each has in the security of its neighbours. By creating the conditions necessary to attract inward capital investment, market-oriented economic reforms will play an important role in upgrading these communication links. The European Union has also expressed its determination to promote the development of trans-European networks. The European Council at Essen in December 1994 also stated that the integration of associate countries into trans-European networks is a key factor in European economic and political integration.

25. Access to technology is a factor vital to the security of Europe. The development of the industrial and technological capacity of Europe is vital both to its economic prosperity and to its security.

26. Most European countries are largely dependent for their supplies of energy and raw materials on countries whose political and economic stability over the medium term cannot be taken for granted. Gas and oil are conveyed, at least in part, through pipelines crossing countries of uncertain stability. In the event of a major crisis, the disruption of those supplies is a distinct probability and maritime transport routes could be vulnerable. The flow of gas and oil to European markets through reliable pipeline and maritime routes hold great political and strategic significance. The diversification of European energy supplies may help reduce these potential risks.

27. The European Energy Charter has as its aim to help make available to countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the countries of the CIS the technologies, expertise and capital they need for prospection, and to contribute to the security of European countries' energy supplies. The International Energy Agency has agreed on an emergency oil-sharing system and other emergency response measures for use in major oil supply disruptions and other situations.

3. The security of European citizens in the world

28. There are large numbers of European citizens living and working abroad, many in unstable or dangerous areas. Many more travel abroad on a short-term basis. Their security over and above that provided by the countries where they are present, is the responsibility of national authorities. This applies to citizens present on European territory as well as to those outside national and European borders and who might find themselves in situations where their security is endangered. Their protection is undertaken through consulates and embassies. Many governments have negotiated agreements with other countries to extend the protection that can be provided.
29. For example, the Treaty on European Union makes provision for European consular protection to any European Union citizen abroad not having a local consulate of his own country. Similar arrangements have been made among other European states.

30. This system of cooperation has recently been successfully put to the test in various situations: Zaire, Angola, the Yemen and Rwanda are just a few examples of cooperation among WEU States in this field. Practical experience in these cases has underlined the usefulness of current work in WEU on evacuation planning and of coordination between WEU and the EU.

C. The new risks

1. Potential armed conflicts

31. The end of the Cold War has brought to a close a period of division in Europe and made massive military confrontation a remote prospect. But dangers remain, and new security risks and uncertainties are emerging in the Continent and its neighbouring regions.

32. Europe faces a broad spectrum of security problems, some of which may lead to armed conflict.

33. Recent events have demonstrated the need to settle border disputes peacefully in accordance with international law. Crises may also arise from severe neglect of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities in violation of internationally agreed norms.

34. Particular dangers arise when armed groups operate outside the law or without proper democratic control. The larger and better armed these groups, the greater the risk of conflict is likely to be. Security risks can also be associated with excessive concentrations of military forces.

35. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia is a source of major concern and a threat to European security: the risk of its potential expansion, the level of armaments involved, the forces mobilized, the extent of human suffering and the degree of international political involvement, all underline the seriousness of this crisis.

2. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means

36. The proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery means continues to constitute a threat to international and European peace and security. A European priority in this field has been to pursue universal participation in, and compliance with, multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation conventions such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and, at the same time, to continue to strengthen export control regimes such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Zangger Committee, the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Australia Group. On the other hand, European countries and defence organisations have relied on deterrence and other means in countering the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. In addition, there may be a need to develop other aspects of defence posture to meet the specific threats from WMD proliferation.

37. When assessing the proliferation of these weapons, a distinction should be made between nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as the risk they pose can be of a substantially different nature.

* Nuclear Weapons

38. The entire international community faces potential risks in the field of nuclear proliferation. On the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, European states faced a potentially serious problem arising from uncertainties over the control of Soviet nuclear forces. The accession of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan as non-nuclear-weapon states to the NPT, which remains the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, has done much to reduce this threat. The process of removal of nuclear weapons from Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine is well underway with the assistance of Western countries; and Russia, who also benefits from such assistance, is continuing with the difficult task of the safe and secure dismantlement of these weapons.

39. One proliferation risk is the possibility that scientists previously involved with the Soviet nuclear weapons programme, but now unemployed, will offer their services to potential proliferators outside the region. The contributions of a number of countries to the creation of the International Science and Technology Centre in Moscow and the Science and Technology Centre in Ukraine, in Kiev, are specifically intended to avert this risk.

40. The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguard system remains an essential feature of the non-proliferation regime. Following the experience in Iraq, a timely adoption of the 93 + 2 programme will strengthen the system, in particular the Agency's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities.

41. Nuclear export controls through the introduction of supply conditions regarding physical protection, re-transfer, technology control and, most importantly, the addition of IAEA full-scope safeguards in recipient non-nuclear weapon states as a condition of supply and the establishment of a regime to control the export of nuclear-related dual-use material have made valuable contributions to nuclear non-proliferation.

The objective of the 93+2 Programme is to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system. Its implementation will contribute to detecting undeclared nuclear activities as the Programme will allow for unannounced (no notice) inspections and accession to the strategic areas in routine inspections.
42. A universal, internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which is currently being negotiated in Geneva with the active participation of many members of the WEU, should be concluded no later than 1996 with a true zero-yield option. Another important priority which would address nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation will be the immediate commencement and early conclusion in Geneva of negotiations for a Convention to end the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

43. The Review and Extension Conference in New York decided on 11 May 1995 to extend the Non-Proliferation Treaty indefinitely. This decision together with the strengthening of the review process and the reaffirmation of the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament will lead to a strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. This outcome was reached without a vote and represents a significant expression of confidence by the international community for the Treaty.

44. The reaffirmation by the nuclear weapons states of their commitment under Article VI of the NPT to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control is an important contribution to international security.

45. Although the incidents of nuclear smuggling have so far been few, and the amounts of fissile material involved in nearly all cases small, the European states are taking the problem seriously. There is now a wide range of assistance being given both multilaterally and bilaterally to improve standards of nuclear materials accountancy and control, and physical protection of sites. In addition, the IAEA is developing a database of incidents and there has been closer cooperation throughout Europe in customs and law enforcement.

* Chemical and Biological Weapons

46. Security conditions in Europe are also affected by the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons (CBW), which may be easier to develop than nuclear weapons. There is also a risk that those weapons could fall into the hands of, or be developed by, terrorist organizations.

47. The Chemical Weapons Convention is the first multilateral disarmament treaty combined with a verification regime banning a whole category of weapons of mass destruction. It is also a means of countering the development of clandestine chemical weapon programmes by means of a new verification regime entailing intrusive inspections. European states are convinced of the importance of bringing the CWC into force as soon as possible.

48. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons. Although the BTWC currently lacks an effective verification system, efforts are under way to add such a system to the Convention.
49. Another key tool is that of export controls. National restrictions on the export of technology, and of chemical and microbiological material, as harmonised, inter alia, in the Australia Group, make the development of CBW programmes by potential proliferators much more difficult. There have been strong pressures from some countries for such controls to be removed on entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention and on establishment of a BTWC verification regime. The members of the Australia Group have undertaken to review, in the light of the implementation of the Convention, the measures that they take to prevent the spread of chemical substances and equipment for purposes contrary to the objectives of the Convention, with the aim of removing such measures for the benefit of States Parties to the Convention acting in full compliance with their obligations under the Convention.

50. Some WEU Associate Partners have joined the Australia Group, and a number of them have applied for membership. They have established national legislation which implements the Group's guidelines, and strictly abide by them.

*M Means of delivery*

51. Security conditions in Europe are also influenced by the development, or acquisition, by states in its vicinity, of missile systems capable of delivering WMD. Many European states participate in arrangements intended to prevent the proliferation of such delivery systems, the most important arrangement being the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Europe has great interest in strengthening this regime and enlarging its membership to cover all relevant supplier states. Missile activities in certain states on Europe's periphery lend added importance to the efforts of the MTCR to halt the spread of technology enabling the production of delivery systems capable of carrying WMD.

52. Although not yet parties to the MTCR, a number of WEU Associate Partners abide by the guidelines of this non-proliferation regime and have established national systems of export controls of missile technology products. MTCR partners have also been concerned, not only to seek the prudent enlargement of the regime, but also, to keep the equipment and technology covered by MTCR under continuous review to deflect any new developments in the production of missile technology.

3. International terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking and uncontrolled and illegal immigration

*International terrorism*

53. International terrorism continues to pose a threat to European security interests. Acts of international terrorism threaten fundamental freedoms and the stability, security and economic and social development of States. They thus constitute flagrant violations of human dignity and rights and are a threat to the conduct of normal international relations. Innocent individuals may be the unwitting victims of indiscriminate, politically motivated acts.
54. Numerous resolutions and declarations in international fora underline that terrorism cannot be justified under any circumstances, and all acts, methods and practices of terrorism, regardless of their motivation, in all their forms and manifestations, wherever and by whom committed, are deplored as acts of aggression, violating fundamental human values and democracy. These acts threaten the security of States and can destabilize legitimately constituted governments.

55. As such, international terrorism is an important security challenge on the post-Cold War European scene, calling for coordinated and cooperative responses. Adherence by States to the international conventions relating to various aspects of terrorism is an important step to combat terrorism.

* Organized crime and the illegal traffic in drugs

56. Given modern means of communication and the greater openness of frontiers in Europe, organized crime is not only a national problem but has international ramifications with the potential to provoke both internal instability and to affect relations between countries. This is particularly the case in certain successor states of the Soviet Union where the collapse of authority has created vast new opportunities for criminal activity. Lack of effective supervision and criminal complicity have made the large stocks of weapons left over from the Cold War years as well as nuclear materials relatively easy to obtain. Equally, organized crime has, in many instances, close links with the financially lucrative production and trafficking of narcotics. There are possible links between organized crime and terrorist organizations.

57. As an earnest of their determination to intensify international cooperation on organized crime, the EU and Associated Countries issued a Joint Declaration in Berlin in 1994.

* Problems associated with uncontrolled or illegal migration

58. Major causes of uncontrolled and illegal migration, both within Europe and between Europe and other parts of the world, are:

- differences in employment prospects and levels of earnings within Europe and between Europe and other regions;
- large-scale social unrest, political repression and massive violations of human rights, internal conflicts or civil war;
- porous borders and weak control mechanisms in many countries contributing to the growth of illegal migration towards Europe.
59. Problems associated with uncontrolled or illegal migration have grown considerably in recent years. As such, it has become an issue relevant to European stability and security. It may, in different ways, pose substantial security concerns for the countries affected both as "final destination" and as "transit" countries. These concerns are:

- massive displacements of persons in particular as a consequence of internal upheavals or armed conflicts in areas adjacent to our countries
- illegal migration can pose a threat to internal security and affect law and order in our societies (links with organized crime, "importation" of political conflicts elsewhere)

60. Other problems associated with migration may relate to the cost to host countries of dealing with large influxes of immigrants both financially and in social terms.

4. Environmental risks

61. The potential impact of large-scale environmental damage on human health economic activities and the ecosystem could affect well-being and stability in sub-regions or larger parts of Europe, and thus stability and security in Europe as a whole.

62. Main sources of potential large-scale environmental damage include radioactive material, dangerous chemical substances, in particular chemical weapons and their components, gaseous, liquid and solid industrial releases, the transport of dangerous substances and the risk of major oil-spills, affecting in particular sea and coastal areas. Of particular concern are the unsafe design, construction or operation of some nuclear reactors and other nuclear facilities, the management, transport and storage of spent fuel, radioactive waste and other nuclear materials in ways that fall short of internationally accepted standards and any past poor practice in the production, testing, storage and destruction of nuclear weapons.

63. The end of the Cold War has shed light on a legacy of large-scale military-related environmental damage. This includes radioactive contamination, the pollution of large land areas, and the dumping or unsafe disposal of chemical weapons and components, explosives and fuels. Unsafe storage and handling of arms-related nuclear and chemical substances pose the continued risk of release and large scale damage.

For example, the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina has so far produced more than 3.5 million refugees and displaced persons, of whom more than 0.8 million have gone to countries outside Bosnia and Herzegovina (source UNHCR).
Large-scale environmental risks are inherently of a cross-border character, thus easily affecting entire regions. Risks are more acute in some regions of Europe than others, reflecting unequal concentrations of industry or military installations handling dangerous materials, and unequal attention to safety standards and environmental concerns. The concentration of environmental destruction and risk of further damage is largest in the countries of the CIS. The Kola region of North-Western Russia displays the largest single concentration of military and civilian nuclear facilities in Europe, presenting significant risks linked to unsafe operation and unacceptable waste management. The Mediterranean, the Baltic and other European sea areas suffer from the impact of environmentally unsustainable economic activities. There are also major problems in other parts of the continent for instance in Central and Eastern Europe. Many of these problems are being addressed. The overall risks will, to some extent, be mitigated by the provisions of the Basle Convention, the London Convention, the Convention on Nuclear Safety (not yet entered into force) and the UNCED follow-up activities on maritime protection. European countries played an active role in the Rio Conference. However much remains to be done.

II. THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

A. The transatlantic relationship

Europe, the US and Canada share a common heritage and are bound by close historical, political, economic and cultural ties. The European descent of many citizens of those two countries strengthens those links. Europeans and North Americans are guided by their faith in the values of human dignity, intellectual freedom and civil liberties and in the democratic institutions which have evolved on both sides of the Atlantic over the centuries.

Transatlantic solidarity is essential for the preservation of peace and freedom and for the strengthening of an undivided, free and democratic Europe. The shared principle of free trade, broad economic interchange and an ever growing flow of goods, services, technologies as well as ideas makes the transatlantic relationship an effective framework for cooperation and the development of free economies. A broad network of bilateral relations as well as daily cooperation in international organizations and other international gatherings are an indication of the global nature of those links.

The maintenance of European security requires a continued effort by both European and transatlantic partners. These efforts are complementary and interlinked. Both the US and Canada support Europe’s efforts towards further integration.

The Declaration on EC-US relations agreed by the two sides on 23 November 1990 is a major expression of the transatlantic relationship in a broad area that extends beyond security and defence. It solemnly reaffirmed the determination of the two sides further to strengthen their partnership in pursuing the values and objectives they share. It also established an institutional framework for regular, intensive and high-level consultations, which have become a common practice ever since. Both sides resolved to develop and deepen those procedures so as to reflect the evolution of
what was then the European Community and its relations with the United States. A similar declaration was also made with Canada. In addition, work is under way to sign at the beginning of December 1995 a US-EU Action Plan for expanding and deepening the EU-US relations.

69. The Atlantic Alliance is at the heart of the transatlantic relationship and embodies the permanent bond between North America and Europe. It is a central element of the European security architecture. Its essential purpose remains unchanged: to safeguard the freedom and security of its member States by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. Its military posture, including an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear forces, deters and defends against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member State.

70. Since the end of the Cold War, new causes of instability, tension and conflict have emerged, to which Europe and North America must respond. At the London and Brussels Summits, NATO decided that the Alliance should adapt its political and military structures to reflect the full spectrum of its new roles and missions and the development of the European security and defence identity, to which it gave its full support.

71. The further development of the CJTF concept and the readiness of the Alliance to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the NAC, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies including in pursuit of the EU common foreign and security policy, reflect these objectives. They will enable the Alliance to conduct its operations more efficiently and flexibly, including with the participation of Nations outside the Alliance, provide separable but not separate military capabilities that could be employed by NATO or WEU, and illustrate the full backing given by the Alliance to the development of the European security and defence identity which, as called for in the WEU Maastricht Declaration annexed to the Treaty on European Union, in the longer term perspective of a common defence policy within the Union, might in time lead to a common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance.

72. NATO has also offered to support on a case-by-case basis peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UNSC or under the responsibility of the OSCE, in order to make its contribution to furthering collective security.

73. These developments confirm the enduring validity and indispensability of the Alliance. NATO remains the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the North Atlantic Treaty.
74. NATO has an important role to play in the further development of a network of mutually reinforcing institutions. Allies' security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe. The new democracies of the East see in the transatlantic link an irreplaceable pledge of security and stability for Europe as a whole and are in favour of direct involvement by the United States and Canada. The fuller integration of all European countries into a continent whole and free cannot be successful without the strong and active participation of all Allies on both sides of the Atlantic.

75. It is therefore important for security and stability in all of Europe that NATO increases its cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as with CIS countries, through NACC and PFP which are very important features of European security cooperation. The objective is to enhance security and stability eastward for instance through practical cooperation such as joint peacekeeping exercises and through ensuring democratic control of armed forces. The efforts of European partners within the PFP framework are an expression of European solidarity. NATO will consult with any of its active partners in the Partnership for Peace if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security.

76. Furthermore NATO has completed a study on enlargement which addresses how NATO will enlarge, the principles to guide this process and the implications of membership and how the PFP can contribute concretely to this process. NATO's enlargement is part of an evolutionary process that takes into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe and maintains an undivided continent. It will threaten no-one and be part of a broad European security architecture based on true cooperation throughout Europe. It will strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance, and complement the enlargement of the EU, a parallel process which also, for its part, contributes significantly to extending security and stability.

77. Bearing in mind the radically altered security environment, the further development of European cooperation in the field of security and defence and the broader definition of what constitutes a security challenge, proposals have been made for a further strengthening of transatlantic ties and a broader framework to express the solidarity and commonality of values and interests that constitute the link between the European and North American partners.

B. Russia, the newly independent states and the development of the Commonwealth of Independent States

* Russia

78. Russia has embarked on a process of profound political and economic reform. The outcome of this process, which is of vital importance for European stability, is not yet clear. The keys to success are the establishment of a credible, stable democratic structure as well as economic and social progress.
However, there are risks. Serious violations of human rights have occurred during the Chechen crisis. The crisis illustrates the dangers of internal instability and the possible threat to regional security. The sheer size of Russia's conventional forces and its extensive nuclear arsenal makes democratic control over its armed forces and full compliance with its arms control and disarmament obligations all the more indispensable. Europe has a vital interest in the fulfilment by Russia and other CIS states of their obligations in the nuclear, chemical and conventional fields and supports further development of disarmament measures. A lack of effective controls over civil and military fissile material adds to the danger of proliferation.

The constructive participation of Russia in preventive diplomacy, international crisis management and settlement in accordance with international obligations and commitments is of crucial importance for Europe and the international community.

Russia has significant potential as a partner for European economies which is reflected in the many agreements with European states and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed with the EU. Furthermore, Russian energy supplies are critical for Europe.

* Ukraine

Besides Russia, Ukraine is the most significant partner in the region for WEU nations. It retains significant military capability and has important potential as a trading partner. The increasing relations between our countries and Ukraine illustrate this fact. WEU has recently agreed on contacts with this country to allow for the development of the existing dialogue. For its part, the EU has signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Ukraine. Europe has a strong interest in the internal stability of Ukraine, as well as in supporting its continued territorial integrity, independence and economic development. Ukraine has made significant progress on economic reform and has agreed to take steps to improve its nuclear safety.

* Belarus and Moldova

An effective political and economic transformation of these countries is also an important element for European security. A continuation of the reform process is dependent upon stable political conditions which will help bolster their independence. The agreed withdrawal of the Russian 14th Army from the territory of Moldova will be an important contribution to security and stability in the region. Cooperation with these two countries is important for WEU countries.
84. Europe has an interest in developing fruitful cooperation in the political, economic and cultural fields with Caucasus and Central Asian countries. These countries are participating States of OSCE and almost all have joined Partnership for Peace; many are potentially important trading partners and suppliers of energy for Europe. Any conflicts in the region should be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the UN Charter and OSCE principles, for the resolution of which European countries are showing active support. OSCE missions are present in various places in the region and the setting up of a peacekeeping force for Nagorno-Karabakh under OSCE auspices is being prepared.

* Caucasus and Central Asia*

85. The attachment of the twelve newly independent states to the CIS framework varies, and some have publicly distanced themselves from certain areas of CIS cooperation. Within the CIS Russia continues to have a predominant position. Although there are now hundreds of CIS agreements, many have not been implemented. It remains unclear how far the CIS will develop institutionally in the future. To the extent that the CIS framework is based on voluntary relations and a genuine pursuit of mutual interests, a further development of the CIS in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and the OSCE, such as sovereignty and territorial integrity, could contribute to the stability of the area. It is important for Europe to continue to support the sovereignty and independence of individual CIS member States.

86. There are many existing or potential sources of conflicts in the CIS area often of an ethnic nature. The continuing conflicts in this area do not in their present form directly affect Europe's security, but the perpetuation of conflicts, with no political solution, cannot be ruled out (extension of ceasefires, lack of genuine negotiations on a settlement).

* The Commonwealth of Independent States*

87. Western security organizations have reaffirmed their commitment to developing a far-reaching relationship with Russia corresponding with its size, capabilities and strategic importance. The intensity of the relationship will be determined by Russian political, military and social reality and its observance of international commitments and standards. Those relations and the substantive dialogue should be transparent and of a cooperative character.

88. WEU has recently agreed on contacts with Russia to allow for the development of the existing dialogue and for the development of exchanges of information on issues of common interest. These contacts, while not duplicating dialogue in other fora, will complement other efforts to enhance stability in Europe.
89. The enlargement of the EU is a process which will have benefits for stability and prosperity right across the European continent. In June 1994 the EU and Russia signed a partnership and cooperation agreement which will, when ratified by all member States, help maximize these benefits by establishing a framework for the development of a substantial relationship between the two parties, including political dialogue. A step forward within this framework was the signature, in July 1995, of an Interim Agreement to develop the commercial aspects of the relationship between the EU and Russia.

90. The adoption by Russia, in May 1995, of its Individual Partnership Program with NATO and the Document on relations beyond PFP, was an important step to develop a cooperative relationship and therefore a valuable contribution to European stability.

* Russia and the OSCE

91. Russia has on several occasions shown interest in strengthening the OSCE as a pan-European security forum. It is the only forum where wider and regional aspects of security in Europe are being discussed with the equal participation of Russia. The Russian proposal to hold a discussion on a common and comprehensive Security Model for Europe in the framework of the OSCE, agreed at the Budapest Summit, offers an additional opportunity for WEU countries to work constructively to influence the development of the European security architecture.

C. Southeastern Europe: political, military and economic challenges and risks

92. The end of the bipolar world order has led to developments in several countries in Southeastern Europe similar to those witnessed in the other parts of Central and Eastern Europe: their striving for the establishment of democratic systems and market economies as well as the reorientation of their societies as a whole towards European values, all of which have a stabilizing effect. The heritage of communist regimes, the destruction of traditional economic links and other factors are nevertheless hampering the process of reform and stabilisation.

93. Meanwhile in other countries of this area, specific developments have taken place where ethnic intolerance, policies of aggression and a combination of other internal and external factors have led to the upsurge of armed conflict. Military force has again become an instrument for the pursuit of expansionist political goals with war replacing the principle of political settlement of conflicts.

94. Since the early stages of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the international community has tried to tackle the problem. Its efforts have contributed to containing the conflict and securing the provision of humanitarian aid. Sanctions have been imposed by the UN on Serbia and Montenegro and have been enforced despite heavy economic losses suffered by the neighbouring states.
95. WEU is actively involved in the efforts of the international community to find a political solution to this conflict. In this respect, WEU is engaged in the enforcement of the sanctions regime imposed by the United Nations both in the mission on the Danube as well as through its participation, together with NATO, in Operation SHARP GUARD in the Adriatic. WEU is also committed to the EU Administration of Mostar, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where at the request of the EU it has deployed a police element with the objective of establishing a "Unified Police Force of Mostar".

96. Problems in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina have not so far developed into military conflicts. The basic question of how to reconcile ethnic disputes with the need for respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of states and the satisfactory functioning of multiethnic societies is still to be answered. The return of OSCE missions, which proved to be useful, would facilitate the search for a modus vivendi there. Conflicts between ethnic groups in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are being discussed in trilateral negotiations between the government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, representatives of minorities and representatives of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia, thus serving so far as a positive example of constructive conflict management in the region. In this case, preventive deployment of peacekeeping forces has proved successful; so have the activities of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities.

97. The pillars of the various peace plans presented by the European Community, the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia, the European Union and the Contact Group are inviolability by force of international borders, respect for territorial integrity, international guarantees and control for human and minority rights, appropriate autonomy provisions, the prospects for post-crisis security and reconstruction arrangements. They form the nucleus of the balanced and equitable approach on which is founded the current Peace Conference.

98. The level of armaments involved in the conflict in Former Yugoslavia, which reflects major differences and imbalances in terms of military potential not restrained by the agreements by which neighbouring countries abide, constitutes a particular threat to European security which could remain even after the resolution of the conflict in Former Yugoslavia. This development as well as the existence in the region of countries enjoying different security status and guarantees underlines the need for enhanced security in the area. The OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation was mandated by Heads of State and Government at the Budapest Summit in December 1994 to address specific regional security problems, with special emphasis on longer term stability in Southeastern Europe.

99. There is a clearly visible common European security interest in:

making efforts for the peaceful settlement of conflicts in former Yugoslavia including the respect for internationally recognised borders;

avoiding any spillover of the existing conflicts and preventing a possible escalation of the Yugoslav crisis into a wider regional crisis;

Recognised by two of the 27 WEU countries as the Republic of Macedonia.
continuing to work for a security architecture which reaches beyond the military aspects and includes common values such as good neighbourly relations, respect for human rights and the rights of persons belonging to national minorities and a common political culture aiming at the spirit of solidarity on common security.

This, together with regional cooperation, would enhance the prospects of the integration of countries in Southeastern Europe into the broader European framework.

D. The Mediterranean Basin and the Middle East: an area of strategic interest for Europe, military and non-military risks for European security

100. The Mediterranean Basin is a high priority for European security. This area merits particular attention from WEU, which has initiated a dialogue on security issues with certain non-WEU Mediterranean countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia).

101. The EU is working on a renewed and expanded policy towards the region as a whole. It includes setting out guidelines for cooperation between countries in the area into the next century, intensified economic and financial cooperation between the EU and these countries as well as a permanent dialogue on all questions of common interest. That is the aim of the Euro-Mediterranean conference to be held at the end of November 1995 in Barcelona. Furthermore, the EU plays a significant role in the Middle East peace process, which has a profound impact on the political situation in the Mediterranean basin as a whole.

102. NATO is also in the course of developing its dialogue with countries in the area (initially with Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia).

103. The maintenance of political, economic and military stability in the region as well as a free flow of traffic through and into the Mediterranean remain priority objectives.

104. Although there does not appear to be an immediate danger of disruption of oil supplies, European states remain vulnerable to a possible interruption of their fuel supplies from North Africa, the Gulf or the Middle East, due to the existing and potential instability there.

105. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their delivery means, in certain countries of this region, is also a cause for concern for regional stability and European security.

106. The uncertainties over the control and capabilities of the Black Sea fleet remain a source of concern.
107. Increased instability and the weakness of democratic institutions in parts of North Africa are today sources of great concern for Europe as a whole. Disputes with some countries on specific issues are not to be ruled out. However, the nature of the security risk is mainly connected with the challenge represented by extremist movements, the asymmetry between Europe and North Africa in economic wealth and in population growth. Extremist forces have engaged in violent activities against their own governments and countrymen as well as foreign citizens and assets. These activities not only seriously threaten stability in the area but may also spill over into Europe.

108. The unsolved question of Cyprus is also a source of concern.

109. The progress made within the framework of the Arab-Israeli peace process has reduced security risks in the area. The countries involved do not present a direct military threat to Europe. A resumption of confrontation could, however, have highly destabilizing effects on the whole area and on Europe. In addition, because of the regional policies adopted by Iran and Iraq, the political and military situation in the Gulf area is a cause for preoccupation.

110. The recent rise of certain extremist movements in the Middle East has led to an increase in the number of terrorist acts which have seriously affected stability in the region and European citizens and interests in certain countries.

E. Africa: an area of interest for Europe, security and stability challenges and risks, the role of European States in African crisis management

111. The African continent has ceased to be a stage for East-West confrontation. Africa's serious economic problems deserve due political attention. A further deterioration of the social, economic and political situation on the African continent would aggravate the risk of permanent instability and increase migratory pressure from the Africans. Further instability is generated by a lack of adherence to democratic principles, widespread, unchecked corruption and violations of human rights.

112. Armed conflict on the African continent is now predominantly intra-state in character. The international community has been faced with the implosion of states and the major humanitarian tragedies which ensue.

Greece recalls, on this point, para. 39 of the Lisbon Declaration.
113. Confronted with this new eruption of conflicts, the Organization for African Unity has set up a mechanism for conflict prevention. This mechanism has been put to the test in the case of Congo, Gabon and Burundi. Sub-regional organizations are also acting in this direction in their respective fields of intervention.

114. European countries are currently examining, bilaterally and in the frameworks of the UN, the EU and WEU, possibilities to support Africans' own efforts, including through regional and sub-regional institutions and structures, to promote the preservation of peace, the search for reconciliation and the achievement of sustainable and socially balanced development through good governance.

F. Asia and Pacific: the nature of the security interests of Europe in this area.

115. Europe has a number of interlocking security interests in the Asia/Pacific region. This region already contains half the world's population. It is also becoming increasingly prosperous. Economically, Europe and the Asia/Pacific region are rapidly becoming interdependent. Europe now does more trade with East Asia alone than with North America. Europe therefore has a fundamental security interest in promoting conditions in the Asia/Pacific region in which commercial investment and free trade can prosper. Europe also has an interest in fostering democratic political stability, regional security and sustainable development.

116. In politico-strategic terms, Europe's interest centres on the balance of power between China, Russia and Japan. The continued presence of the United States in this region will help to preserve stability. Key countries in the region are developing more assertive foreign policies and are increasing their defence expenditure significantly. It is in Europe's interests to establish and maintain a close dialogue - and work for mutual understanding and respect - on security issues with the key countries in the region.

117. Individual European states also have historical associations with particular countries which in some cases convey security responsibilities.

118. Efforts are being made within the region to establish effective mechanisms for defining and controlling disputes. The relevance of such local initiatives has increased with the reduction of the US military presence in the region. Some progress has already been made. The Group of ASEAN countries, established in 1967 to address local inter-state relations, agreed in 1993 to set up a wider ASEAN Regional Forum to address regional security issues. The EU is an active contributor and has offered to share European experience in the field of confidence- and security-building measures. APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) brings the leaders of Asia-Pacific countries together regularly to address economic business and this acts as a general factor of stability in the region. The European Council in Essen (December 1994) confirmed the European Union's willingness to intensify its cooperation with the Asia-Pacific region.
119. In addition to the EU/ASEAN dialogue, the EU/Japan dialogue, the proposed
dialogue with Korea, the NATO/Japan security dialogue and Japanese and Korean
interest in OSCE offer particularly useful opportunities to engage the countries of the
region. Several European countries are working to try to limit the dangers of
proliferation and to advance arms control agreements, in particular with China, on the
Indian sub-continent and the Korean Peninsula.

G. **Latin America: the nature of the security interests of Europe in this area.**

120. Europe and Latin America have a common cultural heritage which is reflected
in the shared values and interests and close relations on the human level. This,
together with problems of a political, social and economic order faced by certain
Latin American countries, call for a European contribution to their progress and
stability.

121. In the specific field of European security interests in Latin America, there are
three priorities: the consolidation and institutionalisation of democracy, the respect
for human rights and regional stability; the achievement of sustained development
and economic integration of the region; and the fight against drug trafficking.

122. Individual European states have particular security interests in this region.

123. While much remains to be done, during the last decade, the Latin American
countries have accomplished a great effort towards democracy. In this effort, they
have had the firm support of Europe, which is reflected in the political contribution to
the solution of conflicts existing in several countries as well as in Europe’s assistance
in applying peace plans through its contribution to peacekeeping operations.

124. Recent years have witnessed the consolidation of Latin American integration.
This is clearly reflected particularly in the establishment of MERCOSUR. Regional
stability and security have substantially improved. In this process, the Organization
of American States has played and continues to play a leading role.

125. Latterly, there have been important advances in the relations between the EU
and Latin America. European economic aid to, and political dialogue with Latin
America have found concrete expression in the document "Europe and Latin
America: A Partnership for Action", approved by the Council of the EU in October
1994. Environmental problems have also received European attention with economic
contributions.

126. The EU supports Latin American countries in their fight against drugs, through
a variety of programmes aimed both at preventing drug production and trafficking and
the laundering of money obtained from the illicit drug trade.
Contributions of WEU countries to European security: enhancing capabilities in the field of crisis prevention and management.

I. THE PROMOTION OF SECURITY AND STABILITY

A. The institutional framework

127. European states have acknowledged that their security is indivisible, that a comprehensive approach should underlie the concept of security and that cooperative mechanisms should be applied in order to promote security and stability in the whole of the continent. The responses to the new security challenges should be based on the existing European and transatlantic institutions and cooperative arrangements, on the better utilization of their capacities, including the possibility of their enlargement, and closer coordination between them.

128. The EU is contributing to stability and prosperity in Central and Eastern Europe through the conclusion of different sorts of agreements. Some of these, the Europe Agreements, contain the perspective of EU membership which provides further incentives for the completion and stabilisation of political and economic reform in Central Europe. The enlargement of the EU will contribute to peace, security and stability in and around Europe.

129. Enhanced cooperation within the CFSP has contributed to a number of far-reaching initiatives of the EU geared to bringing about more security and stability, such as the Stability Pact which is a major contribution to good neighbourly relations including the situation of national minorities. However, discussions are taking place on the possibilities for making decision-making more effective and improving capacities for analysis, planning and implementation.

130. The Treaty on European Union has established a CFSP, which shall include all questions related to the security of the European Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence. In Europe’s changing security environment, WEU should continue its development as the defence component of the EU and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance. In addition to their other functions, both the EU and WEU have a role to play in pursuance of Article J.4 of the TEU and in the area defined by the Petersberg Declaration. In this context, WEU should coordinate more closely with the EU and at the same time continue to reinforce its operational capabilities.
131. The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference will be an important opportunity, interalia, to prepare the institutional ground for the future accession of associated European countries to the EU, to examine how to enhance the effectiveness of the CFSP and to review the EU-WEU relationship. Different options for future institutional relations between WEU and the EU have been developed by the WEU member States in a separate document which will be transmitted to the EU as WEU's contribution to the 1996 IGC.

132. NATO, the transatlantic relationship and the commitment of the North American allies to the defence of Europe are vital and remain essential to the continued stability and security of the continent. In order to promote European security and stability, NATO is considering enlargement of its membership as a gradual, open and transparent process not excluding a priori any European nation. NATO has made it clear that its enlargement will be part of a much broader security policy including the following elements:

- the building up of existing cooperative arrangements such as NACC, PfP;
- the development of healthy and solid relationships both with Russia and Ukraine;
- the strengthening of interlocking pan-European structures such as the OSCE and Council of Europe;
- the promotion of regional cooperation.

133. NACC and PfP are both important instruments for promoting security in a wider setting. While NACC is principally a multilateral forum for political consultation, PfP is NATO's instrument for practical cooperation with individual partner countries (through peace-keeping exercises, military-to-military contacts, etc.) and promoting civilian and democratic control of the military. PfP will play an important role both to help prepare possible new members, through their participation in PfP activities, for the benefits and responsibilities of eventual membership and as a means to strengthen relations with partner countries which may be unlikely to join the Alliance early or at all. The activities of NACC and PfP, by their nature and participation, are important for WEU countries. WEU's status of association agreed at Kirchberg in 1994 for the nine countries of Central Europe which have concluded Europe Agreements with the European Union complements the closer cooperation of these states with the European Union and comes within the same security perspectives as the NATO initiatives.
134. The OSCE, thanks to its inclusive membership, its comprehensive approach to security and the scope of its competences based, in particular, on the Helsinki Final Act (1975), Paris Charter (1990), Helsinki (1992) and Budapest (1994) Documents, plays a fundamental role in creating an enduring cooperative security space in Europe. An example of the useful role the OSCE is playing in the field of conflict management is the process of negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh within the OSCE Minsk Group. The planning for the first ever OSCE peacekeeping operation has been finalised awaiting the conclusion of the negotiations. WEU has offered to support, on a case by case basis and in accordance with its own procedures, conflict prevention and crisis management measures undertaken under OSCE aegis. WEU should now envisage what expertise, or logistic and personnel contributions could be made available for OSCE activities in this field.

135. The discussion on the Common and Comprehensive Security Model for the 21st century currently under way in the OSCE framework may help define the shape of the new European security architecture. In this context, WEU is substantially contributing to this discussion not only through its direct involvement but also through the expression in this Common Reflection of the common security views and concerns of the 27 WEU countries.

136. The pan-European approach of the OSCE could now be complemented by a greater emphasis on regional cooperation, including pursuing the concept of regional tables, in particular in fields such as CSBMs, environmental protection and economy. In the light of experience gained with the Pact on Stability, the work of regional tables is considered a useful method of addressing regional issues and of promoting good neighbourly relations. The structures of regional or sub-regional cooperation will also continue to form an important element in strengthening security and stability in Europe.

137. The network of bilateral treaties has helped create a positive environment for good neighbourly relations by confirming respect of internationally agreed principles concerning the inviolability of frontiers and respect of human rights including those of persons belonging to national minorities.

138. The United Nations is the global institution responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. As WEU continues to develop its operational capabilities, it will support, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with its own procedures, conflict prevention and crisis management measures under UN aegis. WEU should now envisage what expertise, or logistic and personnel contributions could be made available for UN activities in this field.
B. Security and stability in WEU's neighbouring regions and the wider world

139. Arms control and measures aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are important means of enhancing international and European peace and security. The WEU countries have many common interests in this area and much cooperation already takes place between them, either informally or within the framework of groupings to which some or all of them belong.

140. START I and START II are achievements of historical significance. WEU countries will benefit from the implementation of their provisions no less than the parties to these Treaties, and therefore they share a strong wish to secure the implementation of START I and ratification and full implementation of START II. They firmly support efforts to provide assistance for countries which have to tackle a huge nuclear legacy eg. in the fields of control, accountability and disposal of fissile nuclear materials.

141. Following the successful outcome of the NPT Review and Extension Conference, every effort should be made to achieve universal adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Conference highlighted the programme of action necessary for the full realization and effective implementation of Article VI of the NPT by stating that:

the completion by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996; pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint.

the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.

the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

This programme of action constitutes an essential reference framework and WEU countries attach importance to its active implementation.

In addition the enhancement of the NPT review procedure achieved as a result of the NPT Review and Extension Conference will significantly strengthen the non-proliferation régime and its potential should be used to the full.
142. The strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system, in particular in order to
detect undeclared nuclear activities, should be pursued as a complement to the
indefinite extension of the NPT.

143. In the field of chemical and biological weapons, the WEU countries should
undertake all possible efforts to ensure the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons
Convention at the earliest possible date as well as universal participation in it and to
elaborate an effective verification system for the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention.

144. In the conventional field, the CFE Treaty remains a cornerstone for European
security and stability. Its full and timely implementation and the preservation of its
integrity are of crucial importance. The WEU countries will continue to contribute to
the further enhancement and full implementation by all participating states of the
system of measures on arms control, disarmament and confidence and security
building developed in the OSCE framework.

145. WEU countries are engaged in practical cooperation in the framework of the
Open Skies Treaty. In addition, they must persist in their efforts to secure the
ratification of the Treaty by Russia, Ukraine and Belarus so it can enter into force.

146. With respect to land-mine clearance and the current EU joint action on anti-
personnel land-mines, the WEU should consider how best to contribute to the
definition and implementation of specific actions of the EU.

147. WEU countries will explore ways in which a contribution could be made to the
strengthening of the UN Register on Conventional Arms and to giving practical effect
to the OSCE’s principles governing Conventional Arms Transfers.

148. The prudent extension of the membership of export control regimes such as the
Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control
Regime would also contribute to stability and security.

149. With respect to security challenges such as international terrorism and
organized crime, the European States should have coordinated and cooperative
responses. Adherence by States to International Conventions relating to various
aspects of these challenges and their full implementation is an important step to
combat international terrorism and organized crime.
150. The formation of a politically stable and economically developing Russia in which democracy, the rule of law and human rights are irreversibly established is a vital security interest of the WEU countries. A Russian foreign policy, based on cooperativeness, partnership and good-neighbourliness, will strengthen European stability and security. The success of the ongoing political, economic and social reform process in Russia is one of the WEU nations' major interests. WEU countries will continue to contribute to the development of a market economy in Russia. In this context, they support and encourage the efforts made in particular by the European Union with its TACIS programme, by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In addition to these wider efforts, the stability and the social and economic development of the areas of Russia adjacent to the WEU countries are of particular interest. WEU countries believe that regional cooperation can enhance the development and stability of those areas thus contributing to European security.

151. Russia is an important element within the emerging European security architecture. A growing network of cooperative ties is being developed which aims at fully fledged partnership and intensifying cooperation. The development of dialogue and cooperation with Russia through and beyond its participation in NACC and PFP will be part of a broad approach to promoting a cooperative security architecture in Europe. For its part, WEU is fully implementing its decision on contacts with Russia. In this context, WEU has recently agreed a number of proposals to give substance to this decision. In addition, WEU countries support the gradual inclusion of Russia into discussions in the G7 and the accession of Russia to the Council of Europe at the earliest possible moment.

152. Since independence, Ukraine has continuously shown strong interest in increasing political and economic cooperation with the West, with the highest possible degree of integration in European organisations as a medium to long-term goal. WEU countries welcome the intensified political dialogue and other forms of cooperation which have already been established. Enhancement of the relationship between Ukraine and NATO beyond PFP's parameters is a positive development. WEU countries welcome the accession of Ukraine to the Council of Europe. WEU's own contacts with Ukraine should be fully exploited and ways of developing WEU's relations with Ukraine will be examined.

153. WEU countries also have an interest in the security and stability of Belarus and will continue to promote economic reform and democratic development in that country. Development of partnership of Belarus with the European Union and the Council of Europe, active participation in PFP and active contribution to regional cooperation corresponds with the interests of WEU nations. WEU is open to the possibility of initiating appropriate contacts with Belarus in the future.

154. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and Moldova, admission to the Council of Europe and participation in the NATO/PFP programme provide the ground for a future enhanced relationship between Moldova and WEU. In this context, WEU could examine practical modalities for establishing appropriate relations with Moldova in view of enhancing security and stability in the region.
155. The 27 WEU countries also have an interest in the independence, territorial integrity, security and stability of the other newly independent states to their East as well as in the strengthening of their ties with Europe and consequently fully support the conflict prevention and crisis management roles of the OSCE in this area.

156. WEU has established a dialogue with Mediterranean countries on defence and security matters. It should further develop this dialogue and identify ways and means to give such a dialogue an increasingly significant content. The aim is to contribute in an effective way to the stability of a region which is fundamental for European security. This would complement the efforts of other organisations (EU, NATO, OSCE), all of which underline the importance of that area.

157. The promotion of security and stability in Africa has been identified as an important concern of the WEU countries. European countries are currently examining the possibilities of supporting the efforts of Africa itself to promote the preservation of peace, the search for reconciliation and the achievement of sustainable and socially balanced development through good governance. WEU itself is considering the role it might play in support of peacekeeping and conflict prevention by African states.

C. Role of nuclear forces in deterrence

158. France and the United Kingdom, member countries of WEU who are also members of the EU and NATO, are nuclear weapon states within the meaning of the NPT.

In the language of para. 55 of the Alliance's Strategic Concept, the fundamental purpose of nuclear forces is political; it is "to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war [...] by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response to military aggression" and by demonstrating "that an attack of any kind is not a rational option". The Hague Platform states that "To be credible and effective, the strategy of deterrence and defence must continue to be based on an adequate mix of appropriate nuclear and conventional forces, only the nuclear element of which can confront a potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk."

The Preliminary Conclusions on the Formulation of a Common European Defence Policy (WEU Council of Ministers, Noordwijk, 1994), which take up the language of the The Hague Platform and the new Strategic Concept of the Alliance, which were agreed respectively by WEU in 1987 and NATO in 1991, underline that "Europeans have a major responsibility with regard to defence in both the conventional and nuclear field".1 "The independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies."

Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden recall they were not party to the decisions referred to in paragraph 158.
II. CRISIS PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT

A. Capabilities available to WEU

159. WEU, as the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, is playing a growing role in the field of crisis prevention and management activities. WEU has the capacity to act on its own initiative in response to a crisis and, at the request of the EU, will elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the EU which have defence implications. It should coordinate as appropriate with other institutions notably NATO, the OSCE and the UN.

160. At the Petersberg Ministerial meeting in 1992, WEU member States defined the crisis prevention and management missions that could be conducted through WEU by their forces as follows:

*military units of WEU member States, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for:

humanitarian and rescue tasks;
peacekeeping tasks;
tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

It should be borne in mind that as well as mounting military operations in support of crisis management tasks, WEU may, on a case-by-case basis, also coordinate non-military resources as it has done in Mostar and on the Danube.

The flexibility that WEU enjoys through the statuses of its various forms of participation enables Associate Members, Observers and Associate Partners to make their own important contribution to the achievement of these missions.

161. Besides the institutional questions being discussed in the preparations for IGC 1996, the resources and capabilities effectively available to WEU for the performance of these missions are being evaluated. Considerable progress has been made over the past few years in strengthening the ability of WEU nations to respond to crises but it is undeniable that the achievements do not as yet match up to the objectives that have been set.

* National assets for action

162. While it is possible that an individual nation may respond to a particular crisis without assistance from other nations, for an increasing number of operations, it is more likely in practice that nations will join together in some form of "coalition of the willing" to undertake the kind of operations listed in para. 160. In some cases, it may be that multinational forces are declared as available to contribute to an operation.
163. National contributions to these missions continue to be based on the declaration of military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces as being available for Petersberg operations. The organization of these national resources for such operations needs common procedures. Since many WEU nations already use or are adapting to procedures developed by NATO, and WEU operations will rely in a certain number of cases on NATO assets and capabilities, there is a need to keep WEU procedures compatible with NATO’s.

164. In addition to an individual nation’s response to a crisis, there is also the possibility that a cooperative response could be mounted by several nations acting under the direction of a “lead nation” which would be responsible for the command arrangements for the operation, as well as other aspects such as transport and common logistics. In this case, political support could be provided by WEU, which could also help to coordinate national contributions to the operation. Such an operation would remain however under the full responsibility of the individual nation or group of nations.

* Means of collective action

165. Crises or potential crises may call for a wide range of responses. For crisis prevention or management, the EU may use political, economic and financial measures. While it does not have its own military assets, under Article J.4 of the Treaty on European Union, the Union requests WEU “to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications.”

166. WEU’s capabilities for collective action, either in response to the EU or on its own initiative, have been significantly enhanced in recent years so that it could conduct the crisis prevention and management operations set out in the Petersberg Declaration. The Planning Cell was established in 1992 to plan for eventual WEU operations. It maintains and updates a list of national and multinational forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU).

Through the decisions taken at Rome in November 1992 and at Kirchberg in May 1994, the WEU Associate Members, by committing forces to WEU military operations, will participate on the same basis as full members in these operations, as well as in relevant exercises and planning. They also have full rights to nominate FAWEU and may nominate officers to the Planning Cell.

WEU Observers may participate in WEU operations on agreement of all WEU full members. The contributions of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the WEU police element within the European Union Administration of Mostar mark a beginning of WEU Observers’ participation in WEU operations.

WEU’s Associate Partners, following the Kirchberg Declaration, may associate themselves with decisions taken by member States covering the Petersberg tasks and participate in their implementation and planning as well as in relevant exercises.
They provide details of forces which they consider suitable for such operations, which are held by the Planning Cell alongside the FA WEU lists. The liaison arrangement which Associate Partners have with the Planning Cell, that has a prospect for further development, is facilitating their participation in WEU activities. There was a discussion of the proposals from the Associate Partners concerning practical arrangements between them and the Planning Cell.

Further refinement of the lists of forces answerable and available to WEU will remain a high priority.

167. WEU supports endeavours that enhance crisis prevention and management capabilities of WEU countries, for example, the joint Baltic peacekeeping battalion of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, BALTBAT, and the Austrian-Hungarian peacekeeping forces, created as a result of successful international cooperation.

168. The decisions taken at Lisbon in May 1995 to establish a Politico-Military Group, to set up a Situation Centre, and an Intelligence Section in the Planning Cell as well as the adoption of preliminary conclusions and transitional arrangements for the financing of WEU operations, are designed to facilitate and expedite WEU’s decision-making and its ability to plan and conduct Petersberg operations. In this context, Ministers also decided to establish the Satellite Centre for the interpretation of imagery as a permanent WEU body. Proposals for developing capabilities for using satellites for security purposes are being examined.

169. Multinational forces and headquarters are important and valuable instruments for the management of crises, alongside national contributions. The broad spectrum of risks, the multitude of possible missions, and the diversity of potential areas of action require different models of cooperation and a flexible mix of operational capabilities.

170. Member States and Associate members have responded well in terms of declaring resources answerable to WEU, which can also be employed in the NATO context. Besides national forces, multinational FA WEU include:

- the European Corps, which will become fully operational by 30 November this year and in which five countries are represented: Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain;
- the Multinational Division Central (Belgium, Germany, Netherlands and UK) and UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force;
- EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR France, Italy, Portugal and Spain

Designation of appropriate parts of the 1st German/Netherlands Army Corps as FA WEU is under active consideration by Germany and the Netherlands.

Such formations provide a pre-packaged capability with associated headquarters and are an important element of the overall set of forces from which WEU will select force packages designed to meet specific contingencies.
These operational structures, together with other important endeavours such as the Franco-UK European air group, constitute a set of assets whose rules of employment reflect the dual vocation of WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

171. Cooperation between WEU and NATO will help considerably to reinforce European efforts in peacekeeping and other contingency missions. In this context, there is an urgent need to finalize work on the CJTF concept, as agreed at the Alliance Summit in January 1994, to make a vital contribution to providing WEU with an operational multinational command capability. The readiness of the Alliance to make collective assets and capabilities available for WEU operations is fundamental to ensuring that WEU has access to a sufficiently wide range of capabilities, whilst avoiding costly and unnecessary duplication. WEU has contributed to the development of the CJTF concept and has an important interest in the completion of the work by NATO on CJTFs and in the implementation of Summit decisions on the use by WEU under its command of NATO’s collective assets and capabilities.

B. The gaps and deficiencies in European capabilities

172. Despite the progress already achieved, a lot of work remains to be done in enhancing WEU’s operational capabilities and thus WEU is not yet able to undertake large-scale operations either in response to the EU or on its own initiative.

There are several areas, to be addressed in later sections, where gaps and deficiencies can clearly be identified:

- crisis management mechanisms, including procedures for force generation and assembly, and command and control procedures;
- reconnaissance and intelligence;
- strategic and in-theatre transport capabilities;
- standardisation and interoperability;
- the European defence industrial base

C. Experience drawn from the conflict in former Yugoslavia

173. The conflict in former Yugoslavia is taking place at a time when European security organizations are adapting or setting up structures that would contribute further to crisis prevention and management on the continent. European countries have committed themselves on the ground as part of the peacekeeping operation under UN auspices. WEU has made a valuable contribution to certain aspects of the crisis, particularly in the field of sanctions enforcement and its assistance to the EU administration of Mostar. The conflict has demonstrated the ability of WEU to
respond to a request of the EU, as envisaged under Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty, as well as the continued essential role of NATO, especially its importance in non-Article 5 missions.

174. On the political front, experiences in former Yugoslavia can be useful for future WEU operations:

The political aims of the mission must be set out clearly from the start; the mission should be reviewed continually to ensure that tasks are not gradually taken on in theatre which deviate from the overall political aim.

Adequate capabilities and an effective decision-making structure to undertake the Petersberg tasks must be available to WEU.

The need for closer relations between the EU and WEU. Besides the institutional questions being discussed in preparation of the IGC, WEU needs to develop mechanisms for close consultation between the two bodies on both political and operational matters. This will be particularly important for WEU missions of humanitarian assistance and reconstruction which, like Mostar, are likely to involve overall political guidance by the EU, if not actual participation by civilian agencies coordinated by the EU.

The need for closer working relations between WEU and NATO.

The need for a clear understanding of the respective roles of other Organizations involved (for instance, UN or OSCE), in response to a crisis and for closer coordination of their responses.

175. In operational terms, WEU countries need to build on this experience to enhance capabilities in the following fields:

There must be a clear channel of communication between the WEU Council and WEU forces. Experience indicates that, besides the role of liaison played thus far by the WEU Presidency, there needs to be a proper channel of communication linking WEU elements involved in an operation and the WEU Council.

For each WEU operation, there must be a single chain of command for all WEU military forces involved, in order to avoid confusion and delay in carrying out tasks.

Arrangements need to be devised for ensuring efficient coordination in the theatre of operations between the military and civilian elements of an operation, in particular where the civilian elements are provided by another organization such as the UN.
The need for WEU to establish or to have access to an adequate observation capability and to develop an intelligence processing capability which are decisive for the conduct of operations in complex, shifting politico-military environments.

The need to have transport capabilities available permitting the rapid projection of forces and their deployment to the theatre of operation as required. In this field, Europeans currently call upon other countries or the international market for heavy airlift.

D. Responses: enhancing European capabilities

176. In defining its responses to the deficiencies described above, WEU must identify and implement policies and new concrete organizational steps to increase its capability to fulfil the Petersberg tasks and to enhance its contribution to European stability and security.

* Adapt national defence forces while maintaining their effectiveness

177. National defence assets are essential for the security and defence of European countries, underpin collective security and constitute the basis of collective efforts in this field. Nations are undertaking programmes to restructure their armed forces better to meet the new security challenges in crisis prevention and management fields, including peacekeeping. Modernisation of armed forces must include efforts towards greater mobility and interoperability, in order, inter alia, to enable WEU countries to cooperate together in international conflict prevention and management operations.

178. Cooperative efforts including participation in PfP present opportunities of working towards this goal.

179. National defence priorities, at a time when financial resources are necessarily limited, must take account of the obligations entered into vis-a-vis the security organizations (NATO, WEU).

* Strengthen WEU’s politico-military structures

180. An important task for WEU in the coming years is to continue to develop its politico-military structures in order to be able to conduct the full range of Petersberg tasks. This includes:

- Developing closer relations with the EU at the political and working levels in respect of actions undertaken at the EU’s request in the framework of Article J4 of the Treaty on European Union;
- Improving further the close cooperation with NATO;
Establishing and improving effective liaison and consultation arrangements with other relevant organisations, notably the UN and the OSCE. This will enable the most effective coordination of all the international resources devoted to a particular crisis, including non-military elements. WEU countries could also establish appropriate coordination, when they are involved on a national basis in UN or OSCE peace operations and inform as necessary the WEU Council.

* Reinforce European assets and capabilities.

181. In parallel, it is important to examine and reinforce common means for action by developing WEU capabilities that are both effective and credible on a basis of transparency and complementary with NATO, avoiding unnecessary duplication, and capable of undertaking the full range of Petersberg tasks, including the following:

The implementation of the CJTF concept and the definition of separable but not separate capabilities so as to ensure effective use of CJTF where appropriate by WEU and, in that case, under its command;

Continuing the process of developing national and multinational FAWEUs, developing effective operational links between them and WEU and fully integrating them into WEU planning.

Examination of the requirements for, and means of generating, strategic lift for the various types of operations envisaged. Thought should be given to the question of military transport aircraft.

Development of other means for rapid generation of force packages in response to an urgent crisis. The decision on the WEU humanitarian task force will be of use in this area, and provides valuable guidelines for the coordination of military and non-military resources.

Consideration of how to enhance interoperability between national forces. Given the multinational nature of WEU operations, greater interoperability is an essential objective, and extends to all 27 nations which may potentially take part in operations. There is a need to adopt standard operating procedures compatible with NATO and in accordance with UN principles. The Partnership for Peace programme provides a valuable means of improving interoperability. In this respect greater transparency between PFP and WEU activities would be desirable.

Consideration of how WEU might benefit more fully from enhanced participation both of Observers and Associate Partners within WEU’s activities and Petersberg operations.
Further development of a WEU exercise and training programme which should be implemented in harmony with that elaborated within NATO. This is essential for interoperability, and to gain practical experience of decision-making procedures at all levels of the organisation.

The setting up of an Intelligence Section in WEU, which will work on the basis of inputs to be provided by WEU nations, the Satellite Centre NATO and other relevant sources, and which will be capable of supporting WEU in crisis situations.

The development of WEU's capacity to use satellite imagery for security purposes by defining the basic conditions for possible WEU participation in a developing multilateral European programme.

Consideration of the extension of access to a WEU telecommunication system to all WEU nations.

Progress in the above-mentioned areas could be improved by exploring opportunities for burden-sharing and pooling of resources.

182. The various forms of participation in WEU contribute substantially to the ability of WEU to undertake Petersberg tasks. The contribution to these tasks by the Associate Partners should be seen as the manifestation of their intention to contribute to European security and of their aspirations to accede in due course to the modified Brussels Treaty.

183. Restructuring of NATO forces is also being undertaken in the light of the Strategic Concept, with smaller and more mobile forces being an important element. WEU will need to monitor these developments and adapt its planning to cater for the new type of force structures.

* enhancing the European defence industrial base

184. The demand for defence equipment has changed drastically in the past few years. The defence industrial base in all WEU countries is therefore undergoing major changes. European efforts in the field of crisis prevention and management have to rely on new and different kinds of defence equipment, interoperability being an important feature. The European defence industry is restructuring to adapt to changes in demand. Supplying forces with militarily effective weapons and other equipment requires reliable long-term access to leading-edge technology and efficient and responsive suppliers who can respond to common needs. In this respect, the European defence industry should be capable, competitive and commercially sound. WEU countries recognize the need for European armaments cooperation. It was agreed in the WEU Maastricht Declaration to examine further proposals for enhanced cooperation in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a European armaments agency. Such proposals are being examined in the WEAG framework.